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I. INTRODUCTION
“Resource shuffling” occurs when different subnational approaches to
carbon regulation create variations in the costs of production across
jurisdictions. California is the most aggressive jurisdiction in the United
States to address climate change and has adopted a cap & trade program
for its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This Article addresses the
resource shuffling issue presented by California’s cap-and-trade program
and evaluates the merits of various legal and regulatory solutions to the
problem.
Opportunities for resource shuffling arise because of the competitive
interstate electric power market, which is managed largely by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Left to market forces, utilities
seeking to purchase electricity generally favor the least-cost source of
electric power. Federally managed interstate markets tend to reinforce
these least-cost power dispatch practices (i.e., transmission operators deploy
resources to meet demand based on the least marginal cost), but this poses a
potential challenge for subnational regulation of carbon emissions, such
as California’s cap-and-trade program.
A primary goal of California’s program is to force power generation
facilities within its borders to reduce carbon dioxide emissions while
allowing individual producers and sellers of energy to make their own
choices regarding resource allocation. However, California’s cap-and-trade
scheme seeks to do more than reduce greenhouse gas emissions that occur
from plants within state borders; it also seeks to reduce all emissions that
occur as a result of electricity consumed within California’s borders,
regardless of where the power supply source is located.1
The potential for resource shuffling—replacing cleaner sources of
electric power with dirtier and cheaper sources of energy—threatens
to undermine California’s environmental goals. About 30 percent of the
electricity consumed in California is imported from other states.2 This
imported electricity tends to come from disproportionately dirty sources
(such as coal) and represents more than half of the carbon dioxide emitted as
a result of the state’s electricity demand.3 Because of the significance of
these out-of-state GHG emissions, California’s cap-and-trade regime
would only address a small portion of the actual GHG impacts associated
1. See CAL. CODE REGS. Tit. 17, § 95802(a)(140), 95811(b).
2. California Electricity Statistics & Data, ENERGY ALMANAC, http://energyalmanac.
ca.gov/electricity/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
3. James Bushnell, The Implementation of California AB 32 and its Impact on
Wholesale Electricity Markets, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF ENERGY MARKETS at 5, August
2007, available at http://www.iern.net/portal/page/portal/IERN_HOME/IERN_ARCHIV/
Publications/Competition_Issues/57AA9CE3EC9140C1E040A8C03C2F75CB.
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with energy consumption within the state—absent some mechanism to
reduce or eliminate incentives power sellers have to import energy from
dirtier sources of electric power.
As a matter of economic policy a state like California has an additional
incentive to eliminate resource shuffling. Resource shuffling exacerbates the
problem of industrial-relocation carbon leakage because it leads to a
situation in which covered entities are subject to emission limits and
corresponding carbon price premiums, but out-of-state producers that export
their power into the state are allowed to evade these limits and premiums.
Thus, without some means of controlling resource shuffling, out-of-state
producers and importers of power stand to benefit at the expense of instate electric power generators. Overly aggressive efforts by California
regulators to address this problem can also raise issues of protectionism
that run afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause.4 The extent to which
California has authority to regulate or even consider GHG emissions that
occur outside of its borders under the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution is subject to some dispute5—although recent case law would
seem to favor California’s efforts to regulate emissions from out-of-state
sources.6
California regulators operate under a statutory obligation to minimize
the leakage associated with the state’s GHG emissions programs, so
reducing or eliminating shuffling appears to be required under state law.7
California regulators have sought to prohibit resource shuffling, but the
state’s approach to addressing resource shuffling has presented a potential
tension with federal regulation of wholesale electric power markets, leading
the state to suspend enforcement of its shuffling prohibitions and to

4. As its name implies, the so-called “Dormant” Commerce clause does not expressly
appear in the Constitution, but is derived from the Commerce Clause. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5. For a defense of the constitutionality of California’s anti-resource-shuffling
regulations under the Dormant Commerce Clause, see ERIN PARLAR, MICHAEL BABAKITIS &
SHELLEY WELTON, LEGAL ISSUES IN REGULATING IMPORTS IN STATE AND REGIONAL CAP
AND TRADE PROGRAMS 17–46 (2012), available at http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/
files/microsites/climate-change/files/Publications/Students/Legal%20Issues%20in%20Reg
ulating%20Imports%20OCT2012.pdf [hereinafter Parlar].
6. See Rocky Mountain Farmer’s Union v. Corey (9th Cir. 2013), No. 12-15131
(upholding California’s fuel standards under the Commerce Clause, even though they have
an extraterritorial impact on out-of-state producers importing fuel into California).
7. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b)(8) (West 2013).
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reassess its regulatory approach to the problem.8 Despite these changes,
California’s modified approach to regulating resource shuffling remains
problematic for the operation of wholesale power markets. This Article
argues that short of a federal cap-and-trade program or a carbon tax that
has a preemptive legal effect on state GHG regulation, federal regulators
must play some role to minimize the tension between wholesale power
markets and resource shuffling by paying attention to upstream interstate
markets in electric power. Such an approach can encourage subnational
innovation in GHG regulation without thwarting the efficiency or reliability
of wholesale power markets.
Part II of this Article describes resource shuffling and its significance
for subnational efforts to regulate GHG emissions, such as California’s
cap-and-trade program for carbon emissions. It also discusses California’s
initial regulatory response to resource shuffling, known as “attestation.”
Part III discusses the tension that California’s initial regulatory strategy
presented with federal regulators who oversee wholesale electric power
markets. California’s amended “safe harbor” approach to regulating
shuffling fails to avoid this tension and may even increase uncertainty for
wholesale power markets.
Part IV evaluates ways to more effectively regulate resource shuffling.
One way California can address shuffling is to adjust the cap or emissions
limits to reflect that shuffling would occur. Ultimately, however, this
Article argues that since shuffling is a form of carbon leakage a federal
approach to addressing shuffling will be superior to subnational efforts.
The conventional federal solution to leakage is to look to emissions
regulation by the EPA to harmonize regulatory differences across states.
This Article argues that while this conventional approach can potentially
address a significant portion of the problem associated with resource
shuffling, it is imperfect given the EPA’s anticipated flexible approach to
carbon regulation. Federal energy regulators could improve the efficacy of
subnational efforts to address GHG emissions and produce greater
certainty for power markets by addressing resource shuffling through a

8. See Letter from Philip D. Moeller, Commissioner, FERC, to the Honorable
Edmund G. Brown, Governor of California (Aug. 6, 2012), available at http://www.ferc.
gov/about/com-mem/moeller/moeller-08-06-12.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Moeller]; Letter
from Mary D. Nichols, Chairman, California Air Resource Board, to Philip D. Moeller,
Commissioner, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Aug. 16, 2012), available at http://
www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/images/2012/response.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Nichols]; CAL.
AIR RES. BD, RESOLUTION 12–33, CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM (2012), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/res12–33.pdf [hereinafter Resolution 12–33]; CAL. AIR
R ES . B D, R ESOLUTION 12–51, CAL. C AP - AND -TRADE PROGRAM (2012), available at
http://www.arb.ca/gov/cc/capandtrade/final-resolution-october-2012.pdf [hereinafter Resolution
12–51].
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harmonized set of rules or guidelines articulating acceptable least-cost
dispatch protocols for the operation of wholesale power markets. Until
that occurs, resource shuffling will continue to occur, thwarting the ability of
subnational regulation to achieve GHG-reduction goals, and uncertainty
about shuffling will continue to plague interstate power markets.
II. RESOURCE SHUFFLING AND CALIFORNIA’S INITIAL
REGULATORY RESPONSE
To address the problem of global climate change, California has
adopted a number of policies, including a Renewable Portfolio Standard
(RPS),9 a Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS),10 and a GHG cap-and-trade
program.11 Each of these policies is susceptible to carbon leakage, but
California’s cap-and-trade program and its application to the electric
power industry is the focus of this Article. Recognizing both the importance
of electricity generation as a source of GHG emissions and the sizeable
share of power imports, California has crafted its cap-and-trade program
to reduce not only the GHG emissions created within state borders but
also all emissions generated as a result of electricity consumed within the
state.12
In large part, this expansion in the scope of the state’s GHG policy
stems from a desire to minimize the impacts of carbon leakage. The
potential for carbon leakage occurs where one jurisdiction creates carbondioxide-emissions regulations that are more stringent than neighboring
jurisdictions. These more restrictive regulations increase the price of
industrial activity—and thus the price of goods and services—in the first
jurisdiction, creating a competitive advantage for the less restrictive
jurisdictions. This competitive advantage can lead neighboring jurisdictions
to increase their output and accompanying GHG emissions, thus negating
any potential benefits of the original jurisdiction’s GHG-emission
restrictions.
Even if power plants do not relocate to other jurisdictions, California’s
broad approach to addressing GHG emissions makes power markets
vulnerable to a form of gaming called “resource shuffling.” In other words,
buyers and sellers of electricity in the interstate market can take advantage
9.
10.
11.
12.

CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.16, et seq. (2013).
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480–90 (2013).
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95801, et seq. (2013).
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95802(a)(140), 95811(b) (2013).
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of differences in costs across jurisdictions to by structuring their
transactions to claim credit under the cap-and-trade program for GHGemissions reductions that only take place on paper.
At the outset, an illustration of shuffling might help demonstrate its
significance as a problem, as well as California’s response to it. Suppose that
two power plants with equal production capacity are both located outside
of California’s borders. Plant A burns high-carbon coal, while Plant B uses
relatively low-carbon natural gas. For years, Plant A has operated under a
contract to sell power to a California utility (for delivery to customers
within California’s borders), while Plant B has a contract to sell power to
a Nevada utility. Since the California utility must buy permits for its GHG
emissions, Plant A becomes more expensive. Shuffling occurs when the
Californian utility swaps contracts with the NV utility, thus lowering its
compliance costs. Both plants continue operating and producing the same
amount of electric power. In this example there is no overall emissions
reduction, but if Plant A is located further from the Nevada utility than
Plant B, the Nevada utility may need to purchase a greater amount of
electric power from Plant A to cover the line losses associated with
transmission, and there could actually be an increase in the overall GHG
emissions associated with delivering the same amount of electricity to
customers.
California directly responded to the problem of shuffling by prohibiting
it in its initial regulations implementing its GHG cap-and-trade program.
California Health & Safety Code § 38562(b)(8) requires that the California
Air Resources Board (ARB) design its cap-and-trade rules in such a way
that they minimize leakage. ARB has chosen to minimize leakage through
a “first-deliverer” approach.13 Under the first-deliverer approach, California’s
cap-and-trade regulations apply to all first deliverers of electricity into the
California grid, which includes both electricity-generating facilities in
California and “electricity importers.”14 ARB has defined electricty importers
as follows:
“Electricity importers” deliver imported electricity. For electricity that is scheduled
with a [North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)] e-Tag to a final
point of delivery inside the state of California, the electricity importer is identified
on the NERC e-Tag as the purchasing- selling entity (PSE) on the last segment of
the tag’s physical path with the point of receipt located outside the state of
California and the point of delivery located inside the state of California. For facilities
physically located outside the state of California with the first point of
interconnection to a California balancing authority’s transmission and distribution
system when the electricity is not scheduled on a NERC e-Tag, the importer is the

13. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95811 (2013). For a discussion of alternative
approaches, see PARLAR, supra note 5, at 9–17.
14. Id.
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facility operator or scheduling coordinator. Federal and state agencies are subject
to the regulatory authority of ARB under this article and include Western Area Power
Administration (WAPA), Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), and California
Department of Water Resources (DWR).15

By subjecting electricity importers to the reporting and compliance
obligations, ARB’s cap-and-trade rules aim to reduce not only domestic
emissions but also out-of-state emissions that occur as a consequence of
meeting California’s electricity demand.16
CARB’s first-deliverer approach to reducing out-of-state emissions that
result from Californian electricity demand is vulnerable to a particular form
of gaming called “resource shuffling.” ARB has identified three specific
forms of resource shuffling: 1) laundering, 2) cherry picking, and 3) facility
swapping.17
Laundering is made possible by ARB’s provision for “unspecified
power.” When electricity is purchased from the grid, the original generation
source is not always specified.18 As a practical measure, ARB’s cap-andtrade regulations assign unspecified power a “default emissions rate,” which
an electricity importer uses to calculate its reporting and compliance
obligations.19 The level at which this default emissions rate is set is
important: if the rate is set higher than the actual emissions rate, then
electricity importers will have an incentive to specify the source of their
power in order to report fewer emissions and use up fewer allowances; if
the default rate is set lower than actual emissions, the electricity importers
will have an incentive to avoid specified power because using the default

15. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(140) (2013). For a helpful visual
description of the electricity importer concept, see SCOTT MURTISHAW, FIRST DELIVERER
APPROACH TO REGULATING ELECTRICITY IMPORTS IN CAP AND TRADE PROGRAMS 7, 14
(2011), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/ProgramReview/LearningSession1/Presentation
_Scott_Murtishaw_CA_PUC.pdf.
16. In addition, the fact that ARB relies on NERC e-Tags to identify electricity
importers is significant because it potentially exacerbates the potential for California to
engage in extraterritorial regulation of the electricity industry, as evidenced by a recent
California Independent System Operator (CAISO) tariff dispute heard by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). See generally, Order Accepting Compliance
Filing, Denying Late Interventions, and Dismissing Rehearing Requests, 142 FERC
¶
61,111, Docket Nos. ER12-1856-001, ER12-1856-002, Issued Feb. 13, 2013. However, a full
treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this article.
17. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM ELECTRICITY WORKSHOP 24
(2012), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/050412/may4electricityppt.pdf.
18. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(281) (2013).
19. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95111(b)(1), 95852(b)(1)(B) (2013).
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emissions rate will lower their reporting and compliance obligations.20
Laundering is the phenomenon that occurs in the latter situation. Sources
have described laundering as electricity importers labeling electricity
whose source is or could be specified as unspecified in order to take
advantage of the comparatively lower default emissions rate,21 though
electricity importers could achieve this same result by terminating their
contracts with high-emission, specified sources of power and replacing those
contracts with unspecified power. ARB has set the default emissions rate
at .428 MT of CO2e/MWh, which is representative of a relatively cleanburning natural gas plant.22 Because this emissions rate is relatively low,
there is a significant possibility for extensive resource laundering.23 One
study estimates that labeling all specified power as unspecified would
result in an on-paper reduction of 10 mm tons of carbon dioxide that
would not occur in the real world.24
Cherry picking, like laundering, is related to the concept of unspecified
power, but it works slightly differently.25 Whereas laundering occurs when
the specified power has a higher emission rate than the default rate, cherry
picking occurs when the specified power has a lower emissions rate than the
default rate.26 Again, this practice has been described as an act of active
deception wherein electricity importers characterize actually unspecified,
system-produced electricity as originating at a low-emitting source.27
However, a Californian electricity importer can achieve this same result
by replacing its contracts for unspecified power with sources of power
that emit less than the default emissions rate.28
Facility swapping occurs when an electricity importer replaces a contract
for power from a source with higher emissions for a contract for power

20. See JAMES BUSHNELL, ET AL., DOWNSTREAM REGULATION OF CO2 EMISSIONS IN
CALIFORNIA’S ELECTRICITY SECTOR 6 (2013), available at http://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/
pdf/working_papers/WP236.pdf [hereinafter Bushnell, Downstream Regulation].
21. DAVID FARNSWORTH AND RACHAEL TERADA, TRACKING EMISSIONS ASSOCIATED
WITH ENERGY SERVING LOAD IN THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE STATES: A
FEASIBILITY STUDY, APP. 3, at 57 (2013) [hereinafter Farnsworth, et al.].
22. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95111(b)(1) (2013); Bushnell, Downstream Regulation,
supra note 20, at 6.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Farnsworth, et al., supra note 21, at 57.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. For a mathematical description of this more benign form of cherry picking, see
Letter from Judi K. Mosley, Pacific Gas & Electric, to Steven Cliff, Chief, Climate Change
Markets Branch, California Air Resources Board (May 11, 2012), available at http://www.
arb.ca.gov/lists/5-4-electricity-ws/9-051112_pg_e_comments_on_compliance _requirements_
00125651-2_.pdf [hereinafter Letter from PG&E].
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from a source with lower emissions.29 Nominally, this seems like ideal
compliance with the objective of the state’s cap-and-trade scheme:
electricity importers replacing dirty sources of electricity with cleaner
ones. However, because both clean and dirty sources in this scenario are
outside of California, there is no absolute prohibition or limitation on the
operation of the dirtier generating facility. Instead, the dirty electricity
may simply be redeployed to serve another location’s demand, resulting
in no net reduction in emissions. Furthermore, because of the nature of
the electricity market (electrons travel in the path of least resistance,
according to the laws of physics), “green” electrons cannot be separated
from “brown” ones. To whatever extent a California transaction leads to
emissions reductions, they may only exist on paper. The hypothetical
illustration above involving Plant A and Plant B appears to be an example of
facility swapping.
Regardless of whether it is laundering, cherry picking or facility
swapping, for California, the practical impact of shuffling poses a
substantial threat to the ability of AB 32 to meet its goals. California
imports 30 percent of the electricity consumed within its borders.30 Coal
plants represent the most significant source of power imports, and GHG
emissions from imported power account for as much as 47 percent of
California’s total emissions from the electricity sector.31 According to
one analysis, resource shuffling “could result in leakage that exceeds the
cumulative mitigation required under the cap-and-trade market through
2020.”32 One study estimates the carbon dioxide leakage associated with
resource shuffling at 108–187 million metric tons of carbon dioxide
leakage, which translates to 47–197 percent of cumulative expected
mitigation by 2020 under AB 32.33 Furthermore, California’s fears of

29. See DANNY CULLENWARD AND DAVID WEISKOPF, RESOURCE SHUFFLING AND
THE CALIFORNIA CARBON MARKET 10 (2013), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/
default/files/publication/440262/doc/slspublic/Resource%20Shuffling%20-%20Cullenward
%20and%20Weiskopf.pdf [hereinafter Cullenward & Weiskopf].
30. California Energy Commission, California Electricity Statistics & Data, THE
CALIFORNIA ENERGY ALMANAC, available at http://energyalmanac.ca.gov/electricity/ (last
visited Mar. 4, 2014).
31. Cullenward & Weiskopf, supra note 29, at 6.
32. See Danny Cullenward, Don’t Let Accounting Tricks Dominate the Carbon
Market, BERC ENERGY WEEK 2013, http://berc.berkeley.edu/digital-symposium/dont-letaccounting-tricks-dominate-the-carbon-market/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2014) [hereinafter
Cullenward, Accounting Tricks].
33. Cullenward & Weiskopf, supra note 29, at 2.
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resource shuffling are not entirely abstract. Californian independent
electricity generators are particularly worried about the potential for
laundering, especially in light of the Arizona Public Service Company’s
(APS) communications to the market that purchases of electricity from
any of its generation assets should be treated as unspecified purchases
from the Arizona system.34 If the market follows the APS’s suggestion,
then significant laundering could result because 61.7 percent of the APS’s
generation mix comes from sources that likely emit more than the default
emissions rate.35
In the initial design of its cap-and-trade program, ARB addressed this
potential gaming of the system by instituting an outright prohibition on
resource shuffling.36 ARB originally defined resource shuffling as “any
plan, scheme, or artifice to receive credit based on emissions reductions
that have not occurred, involving the delivery of electricity to the California
grid.”37 In addition to its prohibition on shuffling, ARB planned on
enforcing its anti-resource-shuffling regulations by imposing an attestation
requirement on first deliverers. Under this attestation requirement, first
deliverers would have to certify that they have not engaged in resource
shuffling under penalty of perjury.38
III. FERC’S RESPONSE AND CALIFORNIA’S NEW REGULATORY
REGIME FOR RESOURCE SHUFFLING
California’s initial approach to banning resource shuffling at its borders
presented a conflict with federal regulation of wholesale electric power
markets in the western U.S., given the impact a blanket prohibition on
shuffling at California’s border could have on the operation of regional
wholesale power markets. At the extreme, California’s “attestation” antiresource-shuffling regulations potentially conflict with least-cost dispatch
practices, which generally would lead transmission operators to favor the
lowest cost sources of electric power in the interstate market. In addition, by
34. Letter from Jan Smutny-Jones, Exec. Dir., Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n, to
Mary Nichols, Chair, Cal. Air Res. Bd. (July 10, 2013), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/reporting/
ghg-rep/revision-2013/iepattch.pdf [hereinafter Smutny-Jones].
35. ARIZ. PUB. SERV. CO., 2012 INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN 6 (2012, available at
http://www.aps.com/library/resource%20alt/2012ResourcePlan.pdf. 38 percent of the
APS’s mix comes from coal fire power plants, and 23.7 percent comes from natural gas.
Id. The default emissions rate set by ARB is equivalent to a relatively clean-burning
natural gas plant. Bushnell, Downstream Regulation, supra note 20, at 6. Thus, even if
all of the ASP’s natural gas plants are clean burning, that still means that almost 40 percent
of the ASP’s generation assets probably exceed the default emission rate.
36. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95852(b)(2) (2013).
37. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(252) (2013).
38. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95852(b)(2)(A) (2013).
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influencing whose power may be purchased, California’s anti-resource
shuffling regulations can potentially affect grid reliability. Following
federal regulators’ request that California suspend its shuffling attestation
requirement and prohibition, California has developed a new approach to
regulating shuffling. Rather than prohibit all shuffling at its border without
defining which practices are and are not shuffling, the new California
resource shuffling regulations focus on identifying which practices are not
shuffling, so that power producers and importers hopefully will have
clarity regarding transactions to serve power demand in California.
A. FERC’s Response and the Impact on Wholesale Power Markets
On May 4, 2012, ARB held a meeting with stakeholders to discuss its
first deliverer approach and its resource-shuffling regulations. 39 In
response, twenty-two participants filed comments with CARB, the bulk
of which protested the vagueness of the ARB definition for resource
shuffling.40 Many of these participants commented that ARB’s definition of
resource shuffling could cover transactions that are standard or even
legally mandated in the electricity market.41 These commentators wanted
ARB to develop a more detailed definition of resource shuffling that would
specify when an electricity transaction would and would not qualify as
resource shuffling.42 Some also wanted ARB to develop procedures for
ex ante, case-by-case guidance similar to no-action letters.43 Some even
submitted competing comments on the problems that could arise as a result
of ARB depending on NERC’s e-Tags for its definition of electricity

39. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM ELECTRICITY (2012), available
at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/050412/may4electricityppt.pdf.
40. These comments have been posted online. See Workshop Comments Log, CAL.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, AIR RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/lispub/comm2/
bccommlog.php?listname=5-4-electricity-ws (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
41. See Letter from Claudia Orlando et al., San Diego Gas & Electric, to California Air
Resources Board (May 11, 2012), http://www.arb.ca.gov/lists/5-4-electricity-ws/8sdge_commts-resource_shuffling_carb.5.11.12.docx [hereinafter Letter from SDG&E];
see also Letter from PG&E, supra note 28.
42. See, e.g., Letter from SDG&E, supra note 41, at 1–3.
43. See, e.g., Comments of Sempra US Gas and Power on the California Air Resource
Board 5/4/2012 Electricity Sector Workshop (May 4, 2012), http://www.arb.ca.gov/lists/
5-4-electricity-ws/5-carb_5-4-2012_electricity_sector_workshop_-_sempra_usgp_comments.
docx.
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importer.44 In any case, the consensus of the comments was that industry
was concerned about the risk of excessive liability because of the
combination of the perceived vagueness of resource shuffling and ARB’s
perjury-enforced attestation requirement.45
In addition to its vagueness, California’s anti-resource-shuffling
regulations may clash with least-cost-dispatch rules and practices. In
wholesale power markets, power engineers and transmission operators
routinely follow least-cost-dispatch practices, which would draw on the
lowest cost marginal generation resource to meet expected power demand.46
However, under the anti-resource-shuffling regulations, factors other than
low generation and bilateral procurement costs drive procurement
decisions. These conflicting requirements can create confusion and
uncertainty for market actors.
For example, Pacific Gas & Electric’s (PG&E) comments in response
to the May 4 meeting provide a simple, concise illustration of the kind of
decision an electricity importer may face.47 PG&E’s primary concern was
that the cost of allowances would increase the cost of higher-emission
electricity to a point at which the otherwise more expensive purchase of
lower-emission electricity would be mandated by their least-cost-dispatch
practices.48 However, by choosing the lower-emission electricity, and thus
purchasing fewer allowances, PG&E might run afoul of the anti-resourceshuffling rules because it would be taking credit for emissions reductions
that do not necessarily occur.49 The selling utility could simply redeploy
the higher-emission electricity to serve local or other non-Californian
44. Compare Letter from Mary Wiencke, PacifiCorp, to California Air Resources
Board, at 1–7 (May 11, 2012), http://www.arb.ca.gov/lists/5-4-electricity-ws/11-arb_may
_4_workshop_comments_pacificorp_051112.pdf, and Comments of J. Aron & Company, at
1–3 (May 11, 2012), http://www.arb.ca.gov/lists/5-4-electricity-ws/17-j_aron_capandtrade_
comment_may4_2012_workshop.pdf (requesting that ARB not assert jurisdiction over
out-of-state sellers selling power into the CAISO market), with Comments of Southern
California Edison Company to the California Air Resources Board on the Public Meeting
to Discuss Compliance Requirements for First Deliveries of Electricity, Held May 4, 2012,
at 2, 8–9 (May 11, 2012), http://www.arb.ca.gov/lists/5-4-electricity-ws/13-201205-11_sce_comments_on_electricity_imports_workshop.pdf [hereinafter Comments of
Southern California Edison] (advocating for ARB to “[w]ork with the California
Independent System Operator (“CAISO”) to amend the CAISO Tariff in order to assert
jurisdiction over out-of-state sellers who participate in the CAISO market, at nodes that
are physically located outside California”).
45. See, e.g., Comments of Southern California Edison, supra note 44, at 1–4, 6–7.
46. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, DEC. 02-10-062, ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING
TO ESTABLISH POLICIES AND COST RECOVERY MECHANISMS FOR RULEMAKING GENERATION
PROCUREMENT AND RENEWABLE RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT, (2002), available at http://docs.
cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_DECISION/20249.pdf.
47. See Letter from PG&E, supra note 28, at 1–3.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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demand, in which case no emissions reductions would actually occur.
While the particular example discussed in PG&E’s comments represents
a possible case of cherry picking,50 one could easily imagine this same
scenario playing out in the laundering or facility-swapping contexts.
This conflict strikes at the heart of California’s cap-and-trade scheme.
On the one hand, the purpose of cap-and-trade schemes is to force firms
to internalize the pollution-related costs of their behaviors in order to
promote societal welfare. Thus, cap-and-trade proponents should rejoice
at a hypothetical electricity importer’s decision to purchase lower-emission
electricity based on the fact that the lower-emission electricity is cheaper. On
the other hand, cap-and-trade proponents would undoubtedly be
concerned that this transaction does not reduce total GHG emissions.
Moreover, labeling such a transaction as resource shuffling could reduce
the effectiveness of the cap-and-trade scheme by undermining the price
competitiveness of low-emission electricity; if an electricity importer
cannot claim credit for the purchase of low-emission electricity, then it
will be unable to reduce its expenditure on allowances, even though it has
purchased lower-emission electricity.
Another concern is that a prohibition of shuffling at California’s border
could exacerbate the industrial-relocation form of carbon leakage. Any
prohibition of shuffling at California’s border will almost certainly increase
the price of power being imported into California relative to the price of
power consumed elsewhere. Inevitably, this increase in the price of power
imports will benefit Californian in-state energy producers. To the degree that
the increase in the price of imported electricity protects in-state producers
by subjecting both domestic and foreign producers to the cap-and-trade
requirements, this consequence is not only intended but is the very goal
of California’s first-deliverer approach to carbon leakage. Because
electricity producers will not be able to meet California’s demand at lower
cost by moving production outside of the regulated jurisdiction, the
first-deliverer approach—as supported by the resource-shuffling prohibition
—will prevent industrial-relocation carbon leakage in the electricitygeneration sector. However, by increasing the price of all electricity
consumed in California, this regulatory scheme may push mobile electricity-

50. This example would be cherry picking because PG&E would be choosing
between unspecified power, with its associated default emissions rate of .428 MT/MWh,
and a specified zero-emission power source. Letter from PG&E, supra note 28. See
Farnsworth, supra note 25, at 57.
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intensive consumers—for example, factories—out of California, where
they can purchase more and dirtier electricity.
Beyond potentially shifting electricity demand out of California, a
resource shuffling prohibition at California’s border can affect the reliability
of the grid elsewhere in the Western United States. To the extent that
California prohibits its utilities from shuffling dirty power supply contracts
with cleaner ones, this has impacts on the power resource mix elsewhere and
on the transmission grid. Different types of power generation require
different amounts of transmission capacity in order to address variability
in the resource’s output. Power produced by wind, for example, requires
significantly more transmission capacity than coal fired power.51 This is
because coal and natural-gas power plants have historically been
constructed close to the demand that they serve—and thus require relatively
little transmission—whereas renewable energy technologies like wind
and solar, for example, can produce electricity most efficiently only in
locations that have the most wind and sunshine.52 Put simply, making
power dispatch decisions outside of California based on Californian
emission limitations will influence the resource mix and the transmission
capacity necessary to meet this mix. Given that not every power plant is
located an equal distance from California, there is also a possibility that
some resources will require additional transmission simply to make up for
the physical line loss associated with transmitted electric power over
geographic distance.
Perhaps having heard some of the complaints raised in response to the
May 4 meeting, FERC Commissioner Moeller wrote to California Governor
Brown requesting that ARB suspend its enforcement of the anti-resourceshuffling regulations.53 This letter echoed the worries of the electricity
industry over the vague definition of resource shuffling and the affirmation
requirement.54 In particular, FERC expressed its concern that this
vagueness combined with the threat of a perjury prosecution might create
a chilling effect on the Californian electricity market.55 FERC was also
likely concerned that California’s prohibition on shuffling could effectively
allow the state to regulate power plants outside of its borders. FERC has
jurisdiction over “the transmission of electric energy in interstate

51. See Matthew L. Wald, Giving the Grid Some Backbone, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN
(Mar. 1 2009), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/giving-the-power-grid-somebackbone/.
52. Id.
53. Letter from Moeller, supra note 8.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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commerce” and “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate
commerce.”56
B. California’s New “Safe Harbors” for Resource Shuffling
Commissioner Moeller’s letter proved sufficient for ARB to suspend
enforcement of some of its anti-resource-shuffling regulations.57 Ten
days after the commissioner sent this letter, ARB Chairman Mary D.
Nichols wrote back to FERC to inform the agency that ARB had decided
to suspend the attestation requirement for the first eighteen months of
active allowance trading. 58 On September 20, 2012, ARB formally
suspended enforcement of the attestation requirement.59 Covered entities
will no longer need to attest that they have not engaged in resource shuffling
under the threat of perjury.
On October 18, 2012, ARB formally resolved to refine the definition of
resource shuffling.60 In this resolution, ARB proposed thirteen safe
harbors, transactions in the electricity market that would be per se excluded
from the definition of resource shuffling.61 These proposed safe harbors
survived largely untouched in ARB’s draft regulation, which was published
in July 2013.62
The Draft Regulation eliminates the attestation requirement altogether.63
Covered entities will no longer need to attest that they have not engaged
in resource shuffling under the threat of perjury. In addition, the Draft
Regulation amends the definition of resource shuffling to read: “[A]ny
plan, scheme, or artifice undertaken by a First Deliverer of Electricity to
substitute electricity deliveries from sources with relatively lower emissions
for electricity deliveries from sources with relatively higher emissions

56. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012).
57. Letter from Nichols, supra note 8.
58. Id.
59. Resolution 12–33, supra note 8.
60. Resolution 12–51, supra note 8.
61. CAL. AIR RES. BD, Attachment A to RESOLUTION 12–51 (2012), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/attachmenta.pdf [hereinafter ARB, Attachment A
to Resolution 12–51].
62. Compare id., with CAL. AIR RES. BD, ARTICLE 5: CALIFORNIA CAP ON GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS AND MARKET-BASED COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS § 95852(b)(2)(A), at 96
(2013), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/071813/ct_reg_2013_
discussion_draft.pdf [hereinafter Discussion Draft].
63. Discussion Draft, supra note 62, § 95852(b)(2), at 96.

57

ROSSI-SMITH(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE)

10/4/2016 9:01 AM

resources to reduce its emissions compliance obligation.”64 This definition is
more of a refinement than a revolution of the earlier definition. By focusing
on the substitution of lower emission electricity for higher emission
electricity, the new definition better captures the mechanisms of resource
shuffling. Indeed, the one feature that laundering, cherry picking, and
facility swapping have in common is that they all involve first-importer
utilities moving from nominally higher emissions electricity sources to
nominally lower emissions sources.65 In addition to modifying the definition
of resource shuffling, the Draft Regulation has provided a specific example
of the kind of activities that would constitute resource shuffling.66
The July 2013 Draft Regulation further changes the definition of resource
shuffling by adopting the thirteen safe harbors that ARB originally proposed
in October 2012.67 According to ARB staff, these include situations where
utilities are required to deliver electricity, situations where lower emission
electricity replaces higher emission electricity due to circumstances beyond a
utility’s control, situations where power from high emission sources is cut
back due to low electricity demand, and short term transactions that occur
for economic reasons—such as congestion—rather than emissions
regulations.68
The safe harbor provisions in the new definition of resource shuffling
provided in the July 2013 Draft Regulation have come under criticism for
being too permissive and broad in addition to allowing electricity
importers to engage in considerable resource shuffling. 69 Furthermore,
these safe harbors have been criticized for failing to add clarity to the
resource shuffling regulations.70 Economists Danny Cullenward and David
Weiskopf single out Draft Regulation §§ 95852(b)(2)(A)(6) and (8) as
being especially broad and permissive.71 They appear to have identified a
problem with California’s new approach: It allows power deliverers to call a
broad range of practices something other than shuffling, even where the
effect of these practices is to increase or avoid reducing carbon emissions.

64. Id. § 95802(a)(252), at 47.
65. See generally supra notes 27–36 and accompanying text.
66. Discussion Draft, supra note 62, § 95852(b)(2)(B), at 99.
67. Compare Discussion Draft, supra note 62, § 95852(b)(2)(A), at 86, with ARB,
Attachment A to Resolution 12–51, supra note 61.
68. CAL. AIR RES. BD, STAFF REPORT: INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE CALIFORNIA CAP ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND MARKETBASED COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS 30–31 (2013), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/
2013/capandtrade13/capandtrade13isor.pdf [hereinafter ARB, Staff Report].
69. See Cullenward & Weiskopf, supra note 29, at 19–27.
70. See id. at 31–33.
71. See id. at 21, 23–24.
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Under safe harbor 6, “electricity deliveries that substitute for deliveries that
have been discontinued because of termination of a contract or
divestiture of resources for reasons other than reducing GHG compliance
obligation” is not resource shuffling.72 Cullenward and Weiskopf point
out that “so long as [an electricity importer] could make a colorable
argument that it was motivated by something other than the resource
shuffling implications of its actions,” it could theoretically shuffle resources
without running afoul of the anti-resource-shuffling regulation.73
Interestingly, Cullenward and Weiskopf analyzed the language of the safe
harbor provisions found in ARB’s October 2012 resolution.74 The
original sixth safe harbor contained the additional requirement that to
avoid being counted as resource shuffling, new electricity deliveries must be
“necessitated” by the termination or divestiture of dirtier resources.75
While Cullenward and Weiskopf are skeptical of the limiting force of the
term necessitated,76 it is somewhat telling that even this potentially flimsy
limit to accessing ARB’s safe harbors has been removed.
Cullenward and Weiskopf are also especially critical of Draft Regulation §
95852(b)(2)(A)(8), which creates a safe harbor for “[e]lectricity deliveries
that are necessitated by expiration of a contract.” 77 Cullenward and
Weiskopf argue that this safe harbor will incentivize participants in the
California electricity market to enter into short-term contracts.78 Because
these contracts will expire more frequently, Cullenward and Weiskopf
argue, there will be more frequent opportunities for electricity importers
to engage in resource shuffling with impunity.79 It is quite possible that
Cullenward and Weiskopf overstate their case. Californian electricity
importers will no doubt be familiar with the history of the California
electricity crisis, in which California’s prohibition on entering into longterm contracts left electricity purchasers vulnerable to the volatility and
manipulation of the short-term electricity market.80 Wary of a repeat of
72. Discussion Draft, supra note 62, § 95852(b)(2)(A)(6), at 97.
73. Cullenward & Weiskopf, supra note 29, at 23.
74. See id.; ARB, Attachment A to Resolution 12–51, supra note 61.
75. ARB, Attachment A to Resolution 12–51, supra note 61.
76. Cullenward & Weiskopf, supra note 29, at 23.
77. Discussion Draft, supra note 62, § 95852(b)(2)(A)(8); see Cullenward &
Weiskopf, supra note 29, at 24.
78. Cullenward & Weiskopf, supra note 29, at 24.
79. Id.
80. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 710–11 (3d. ed. 2010).
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2000 and 2001, electricity importers likely will not abandon long-term
contracts en masse merely to engage in shuffling.
Safe harbor 1 also presents problems for the emissions-reduction goal
of the cap-and-trade program, but these problems are fewer than one might
think. Under safe harbor 1, shuffling does not include any “[e]lectricity
deliveries that are caused by the procurement of electricity eligible to be
counted towards and purchased for Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS)
compliance in California.”81 Essentially, this means that first deliverers can
engage in facility swapping or cherry picking so long as the lower-emission,
specified power source in question comes from a renewable energy source
and the generating facility meets certain tracking requirements. 82 On
one hand, this could lead to significant carbon leakage because shuffling is
no less real merely because a renewable resource is involved.
On the other hand, after December 31, 2016, 75 percent or more of the
renewable electricity counted towards Californian utilities’ RPS compliance
requirements must come from sources whose contribution to the Californian
electricity market cannot require a substitute power source elsewhere.83
This means that only 25 percent of electricity procured pursuant to the
RPS will be able to come from shuffled electricity contracts, which
significantly limits the potential for the RPS safe harbor to undermine the
prohibition on shuffling.
Nevertheless, Cullenward and Weiskopf correctly fault the safe harbors as
overly broad and permissive. Many of the safe harbors have been drafted
purposively, and are thus defined in terms of transactions “made for the
purpose of” XYZ.84 Covered entities could easily make the claim that
resource-shuffling transactions were made with any one of the safe
harbors’ purposes in mind.85 Moreover, depending on the burden of proof
for establishing safe-harbor protection—which has not been specified in
81.
82.

Discussion Draft, supra note 62, § 95852(b)(2)(A)(1), at 96.
Cullenward & Weiskopf, supra note 29, at 21; see CAL. ENERGY COMM’N,
RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD ELIGIBILITY 57–91 (7th ed. 2013), available at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2013publications/CEC-300-2013-005/CEC-300-2013-005-ED7-SD
-marked.pdf.
83. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.16(b)(1), (c) (2013); CAL. PUBLIC UTILITIES
COMM’N, DEC 11-12-052, ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING TO CONTINUE IMPLEMENTATION
AND ADMINISTRATION OF CALIFORNIA RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD PROGRAM
(2011), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/WORD_PDF/FINAL_DECISION/156060.
PDF. This nonsubstituted electricity must comprise no less than 50 percent of the utilities’ RPS
requirement in the compliance period ending on December 31, 2013, and no less than 65
percent of the utilities’ RPS requirement in the period ending on December 31, 2016. See
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.16(b)(1), (c) (2013).
84. See, e.g., Draft Regulation, supra note 62, § 95852(b)(2)(A)(2), at 96 (exempting
“electricity deliveries made for the purpose of compliance with state or federal laws and
regulations” from the definition of resource shuffling) (emphasis added).
85. See. e.g., Cullenward & Weiskopf, supra note 29, at 22.
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the regulation86—ARB or any other enforcement body may have to prove the
electricity importer’s subjective intent. If, for example, ARB were to
bring an enforcement action against an electricity importer and the
electricity importer counters that it made the transaction in question for
the purpose of complying with NERC Reliability Standards,87 then if ARB
has the burden of proving that a safe harbor does not exist as part of its
case in chief, the agency would have to prove that the electricity importer
entered into the transaction for some purpose other than compliance
with NERC Reliability Standards. If this were the case, the difficulty of
bringing an enforcement action would likely undermine the effectiveness
of the ban.
Furthermore, these safe harbors, despite their number and breadth, do
not lend the regulatory regime sufficient clarity to mollify the original
concerns about market confusion. The safe harbors are so broad that they
undermine effective enforcement, and at the same time they are also too
vague to provide reassurance to the industry. For example, these safe
harbors do not satisfactorily answer PG&E’s questions: would the decision
to switch from a higher-cost, higher-emission electricity source to a lowercost, lower-emission electricity source pursuant to least-cost dispatch
requirements constitute shuffling? If so, how should PG&E structure its
procurement decisions?
With regard to the first question, safe harbor 2 creates significant
uncertainty.88 Because the decision to switch to lower-emission electricity
would be motivated by a desire to comply with least-cost dispatch
requirements mandated by the California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC),89 this transaction would seem to qualify under safe harbor 2.
However, from a consequentialist perspective, ARB probably did not intend
such a result, because that would mean that the prohibition on resource
shuffling would never apply any time that lower-emission electricity,
by virtue of its smaller allowance-purchase requirement, was cheaper than
higher-emission electricity. This would exempt every instance of shuffling

86. See id. at 32, 39 (including an explicit burden of proof in the authors’ proposed
regulation).
87. See Discussion Draft, supra note 62 § 95852(b)(2)(A)(3), at 96–97.
88. See id. § 95852(b)(2)(A)(2) at 96.
89. See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Dec. 02-10-062, Order Instituting Rulemaking to
Establish Policies and Cost Recovery Mechanisms, at 1–3 (2002), available at http://docs.
cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_DECISION/20249.pdf. PG&E Letter, supra note 28, at 1–
3.
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from the prohibition—or at least enough instances of shuffling so as to
nullify the prohibition—although theoretically, first deliverers would not
be exempt from the prohibition if the lower-emission electricity cost more
than the higher-emission electricity. But one would have to wonder when
and why a first deliverer would switch to a source of electricity that cost more
than its alternatives, and how an electricity importer could make such a
decision without running counter to least-cost dispatch practices.
If, as is likely the case, PG&E’s hypothetical transaction were not
allowed to qualify for safe harbor 2, then it remains unclear what PG&E
could or would be required to do. Most likely, PG&E would not be able
to reduce its compliance obligation by purchasing the lower-emission
electricity. But this solution is not as simple as it seems. Expanding on
the hypothetical offered in PG&E’s comments, one could imagine a
highly efficient (low-emission) natural gas power plant whose bilateral
contract price of electricity was less than that for an inefficient, dirtyburning coal-fire power plant—not an impossible hypothetical given recent
prices of natural gas. One could even imagine the contract price of the
natural-gas power plant’s electricity being so low that purchasing electricity
from the natural-gas power plant would be less expensive even if PG&E
were not allowed to purchase fewer allowances. The question would
then be—how many allowances would PG&E have to purchase? What
would count as PG&E’s “original” source of electricity, for which it was
substituting the lower-emission electricity from the natural-gas power
plant? Given the number of sellers that a utility like PG&E purchases from,
there may be several options to choose from. Could PG&E purchase
allowances equivalent to the default emissions rate?90 The regulations do
not answer these questions satisfactorily.
IV. LOOKING UPSTREAM TO WHOLESALE POWER MARKETS FOR A
SOLUTION TO SHUFFLING
California’s attestation and safe harbor approaches to regulating shuffling
are seriously problematic, given the significant role that wholesale power
markets play in supplying power to meet the demand of customers.
California might attempt to address the leakage problems associated with
shuffling on its own—perhaps by even setting a significantly higher implicit
carbon price in its cap-and-trade system (by effectively lowering its cap)—
but in the end shuffling only highlights the significance of regional and
national markets in electricity for many states in the U.S. today. Given
this significance, the ultimate solutions to carbon leakage problems must
be national, not subnational. The EPA, for example, could address carbon
90.
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leakage issues by adopting national emissions standards or, at the extreme,
adoption of a national or international carbon tax.91 However, to the
extent federal carbon emissions standards constitute a “floor,” allowing
states or regional air boards to adopt more rigorous carbon emissions
standards, leakage will continue to plague subnational efforts to regulate
carbon emissions. Another avenue would be for federal energy regulators to
adopt, or encourage state or regional entities to adopt, upstream
guidelines to manage carbon leakage in energy dispatch decisions. This
article examines how FERC might develop such guidelines and how these
kinds of federal guidelines may be superior to allowing subnational
regulators to manage shuffling on their own.
A. An Unlikely California Solution
California’s attestation and shuffling approaches do not adequately
address the problems associated with shuffling. There may be minor tweaks
that can clarify some of the ambiguity and close the loopholes associated
with safe harbors, but ultimately California regulators are likely to favor
California-produced electricity over electricity that is imported from outof-state. Such an approach does not bode well for the efficient operation
of interstate power markets in the West or in other areas of the country
where subnational carbon emissions requirements present a risk of similar
carbon leakage from electric power usage.
Another possible solution, which the economist James Bushnell and his
coauthors have proposed,92 would be to simply recognize that carbon
leakage and shuffling is an economic reality and to assume that it will
occur. If this assumption is made, the economic solution would seem to
be to adjust the price of carbon accordingly. In a cap-and-trade system,
where the price is implicit, this can only be achieved by reducing the cap
on carbon, which would result in a rise in allowance prices. If the estimates
above are correct in suggesting that the leakage associated with shuffling
could constitute as much as 47–197 percent of cumulative expected

91. Unless carefully designed to include border tax adjustments, even a national
carbon tax does not solve the carbon leakage problem. For example, airlines can simply
refuel in jurisdictions without a tax. For discussions of these complexities see Gilbert E.
Mercalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499
(2009).
92. See Bushnell, Downstream Regulation, supra note 20.
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mitigation by 2020,93 a substantial reduction in California’s cap would be
required.
Such a reduction in allowed carbon emissions may be what is necessary in
order for a state like California or any subnational regulatory body to
address the leakage associated with shuffling. Serious concerns already
abound regarding whether the carbon price is too low, and an increase of
this nature would have a variety of secondary benefits in moving towards
lower carbon sources of power supply. However, such a substantial
decrease in the cap seems politically controversial and unlikely, especially in
an environment where California’s approach has already generated
substantial industry and political backlash.
B. EPA and Carbon Leakage from Subnational Regulation
Another potential solution is to recognize that, at its core, shuffling is a
byproduct of a jurisdictional mismatch with subnational approaches to
regulating carbon emissions. It is well recognized that problems associated
with carbon emissions transcend any individual jurisdiction’s ability to
address the issue. The scale of the problem has been recognized to be
national or even international in scope.94
Given this, a carbon tax or cap-and-trade program at the national level
could be devised to address shuffling. A single price for carbon emissions
that has a legally preemptive effect on subnational carbon regulation efforts,
whether they occur in California or elsewhere, would eliminate incentives for
shuffling at the subnational level. However, such an approach has not had
sufficient political support at the national level in the U.S. and its future
adoption seems unlikely. It also may be undesirable to completely preempt
subnational efforts to adopt more restrictive carbon regulations than the
federal government, given the disproportionate impact that climate change
may have on some states.95
Short of adopting a price for carbon, the EPA has taken significant
action towards regulating the carbon emissions from both new and existing
power plants. How these standards are implemented could make a

93. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
94. For discussion of the implications of the global impacts of carbon emissions on
preemption and the choice of federal or state regulation, see Robert L. Glicksman &
Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Regulation by Federal
Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579
(2008).
95. As the decision in Massachusetts v. EPA indicates, some places are more likely
than others to experience adverse effects arising from global climate change.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1442–43 (2007). States bordering the ocean, for
example, are at greater risk of flooding than are places that lack coastlines.
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significant difference in the incentives for shuffling at the subnational
level. However, even a national emissions standard adopted by the EPA
would likely present economic and regulatory challenges for any effort to
eliminate shuffling, leaving the EPA ill-equipped to solve the problem on
its own.
The first challenge is economic. In their present and anticipated form,
any national GHG emissions standards for power plants will establish a
floor, not a ceiling. States like California, or regional bodies such as RGGI,
still may adopt more restrictive limitations on the emissions of carbon.
More restrictive carbon emissions requirements will create the kinds of
jurisdictional differences in power production costs across states that make
shuffling attractive in the first place. Absent preemption of state carbon
limits, economic incentives for private actors to engage in practices such
as shuffling will continue.
The EPA may attempt to police this by approving state approaches to
implementing the CAA, but the second challenge it will face is regulatory.
In part because of the Clean Air Act’s reliance on states, and in part due
to diffuse political opposition to national carbon emissions standards, the
EPA has signaled that it intends to be flexible in recognizing state
compliance with any national standards. This kind of approach will present
challenges to federal regulators given differences across states in the
stringency of emissions approaches. Under section 111(d) of the CAA,
the EPA seems likely to give states “credit” towards their emissions for
various renewable, clean energy, and energy efficiency policies. As one
author has noted:
[Since] the stricter state programs do not result in increased stringency of the
national program, those state programs may not reduce emissions, but rather
simply export them to other states. Emitters that comply with strict state programs
will over-comply with the federal standards, and therefore will have allowances
or credits that can be traded to out-of-state emitters. The buyers of these credits
can then emit the same amount of GHGs that the state sought to eliminate.
Because GHGs are global pollutants, the state policy would see no environmental
benefit.96

This kind of problem seems inevitable if the EPA embraces flexibility
in its compliance approach to any carbon emissions limits. There may be
solutions, if for example a stricter state opts out of 111(d) flexibility or

96. See Nathan Richardson, Playing Without Aces: Offsets and the Limits of Flexibility
Under Clean Air Act Climate Policy, 42 ENVTL. L. 735, 774 (2012).
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only allows tradable emissions for any emissions reductions that are
beyond what both federal and state regulations require.97 But still,
differences in state regulatory approaches will inevitably contribute to the
economic incentives for shuffling, and short of a legally preemptive
national price on carbon, the EPA does not appear to have a clear regulatory
tool for managing the problem.
C. Managing Shuffling Upstream, in Wholesale Power Markets
Another underexplored avenue for controlling shuffling is to look
upstream—to the economic incentives created by interstate power markets.
Under Part II of the Federal Power Act, these markets are exclusively
controlled by FERC, not by any other regulator.98 Although competitive
markets favor least-cost dispatch practices, FERC has a statutory obligation
to ensure that the wholesale rates charged in these markets are not unjust,
unreasonable and unduly discriminatory,99 and to ensure reliability.100
National guidelines that prohibit shuffling could be a valid exercise of
FERC’s regulatory authority.
To imagine what federal energy market guidelines prohibiting shuffling
might look like, one need only consider existing federal regulatory
initiatives that cover interstate power markets. FERC already regulates
the rates and reliability conditions imposed by Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTOs) and Independent Service Operators, including
California’s Independent Service Operator.101 A substantial new initiative
by FERC is focusing on transmission planning, and requires transmission
organizations to consider state public policy requirements.102 These
requirements conceivably could include state emissions reduction goals
that go beyond federal emissions requirements, such as California’s capand-trade program for carbon emissions. As part of its approval of
transmission operation plans, FERC could specify its own least -cost
protocols for regional markets with state or regional carbon emissions
requirement. These protocols could include harmonized safe harbors that

97. Id.
98. FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over the “transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce,” the “sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce,”
and “all facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy.” Federal Power Act
(FPA) § 201,16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012).
99. Federal Power Act (FPA) §§ 205–06, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(d)–(e).
100. Id. § 215, 16 U.S.C. § 824(o).
101. See Order No. 888, 75 F.E.R.C. 61,080 (1996); Order No. 889, 75 F.E.R.C.
61,078 (1996); Order No. 2000, 89 F.E.R.C. 61,285 (1999).
102. Order No. 1000, 145 F.E.R.C. 61,252 (2013).
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would apply in regional power markets regardless of the jurisdictional
differences in emissions requirements.
An upstream approach to managing shuffling by federal energy regulators
would avoid potential preemption conflicts, as occurred between California
regulators and FERC. From a political economy perspective, such a
harmonized approach could serve to safeguard against individual states
protecting in-state producers and discouraging the purchase of power on
the interstate power market through their approach to managing shuffling. At
the same time, such an approach would set the stage for a national
approach to carbon regulation that still leaves space for subnational carbon
emission approaches. Even with national carbon regulation, such guidelines
could be important before national standards will only be a floor, so such
an approach would better position energy markets to accommodate effective
carbon regulation than the current approach of leaving the management of
shuffling to state regulators.
V. CONCLUSION
The potential for shuffling in wholesale power markets thwarts
California’s ability to meet its AB 32 GHG emission reduction goals, and
may even lead to emissions increases. Yet, as California’s efforts illustrate,
resource shuffling is extremely difficult to regulate at the state level. Short of
California aggressively reducing its emissions limits to reflect the leakage
problem of shuffling, the state is incapable of solving the problem on its own.
As states follow California’s lead in crafting their own approaches to
regulating GHG emissions, national solutions will be necessary to address
the problem of resource shuffling, given interstate markets in wholesale
electric power. Undoubtedly EPA can play a role, but its flexible approach
to state carbon regulation suggests it is likely to leave the management of
shuffling largely to states. Moreover, without some ability to preempt
states the EPA too is ill-equipped to address shuffling. This Article has
argued that the superior solution to resource shuffling lies upstream, in the
electric power markets managed by FERC. For subnational carbon
emissions regulation to meet its goals, it must be recognized that shuffling is
a problem created by pricing practices in upstream interstate power markets.
The ultimate solution to this problem lies with the federal regulators who
manage these markets, not with individual states.
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